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Abstract
We give a formal model for systems that store data in entangled form. We propose a new notion of entanglement, called
all-or-nothing integrity (AONI) that binds the users’ data in a way that makes it hard to corrupt the data of any one user without
corrupting the data of all users. AONI can be a useful defense against negligent or dishonest storage providers who might otherwise
be tempted to discard documents belonging to users without much clout. We show that, if all users use a fixed standard recovery
algorithm, we can implement AONI using a MAC, but, if some of the users adopt instead a non-standard recovery algorithm
provided by the dishonest storage provider, AONI can no longer be achieved. However, even for the latter scenario, we describe a
simple entangling mechanism that provides AONI for a restricted class of destructive adversaries.
c© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Suppose that I provide you with remote storage for your most valuable information. I may advertise various
desirable properties of my service: underground disk farms protected from nuclear attack, daily backups to chiseled
granite monuments, replication to thousands of sites scattered across the globe. But what assurance do you have that
I will not maliciously delete your data as soon as your subscription check clears?
If I consider deleting the data of a rich or powerful customer, I may be deterred by economic, social, or legal
repercussions. The small secret joy I might experience from the thought of the loss will not compensate me for losing
a posted bond, destroying my reputation, or being imprisoned. But if you are an ordinary customer who does not have
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much clout, and I see a lucrative opportunity in altering – or simply neglecting to keep – your data, then deterrence
loses its effectiveness. Consequently, data of powerful customers end up being more protected than data of average
customers. To convince an average customer that she will not lose her data at my random whim, I might offer stronger
technical guarantees that I cannot destroy her data without serious costs. One way to do this would be to link the fate
of her documents to the documents of enough other users that I cannot hope to offend them all with impunity. We
shall call such documents entangled.
Data entanglement was initially suggested as a mechanism for increasing censorship resistance in document-
storage systems, e.g., Dagster [20] and Tangler [14]. These systems split data into blocks in such a way that a single
block becomes part of several documents. New documents are represented using some number of existing blocks,
chosen randomly from the pool, combined with new blocks created using exclusive-or (Dagster) or 3-out-of-4 secret
sharing [18] (Tangler). Dagster and Tangler use entanglement as one of many mechanisms to prevent a censor from
tampering with unpopular data; others involve disguising the ownership and contents of documents and (in Tangler)
storing documents redundantly.
It is not clear that data entanglement is actually useful for censorship resistance. Instead of having to specifically
attack a target document, a censor only needs to damage any document entangled with the target to achieve his goal.
Instead, we consider data entanglement for a different purpose: protecting the data from an untrusted storage provider
that might be tempted to damage or destroy the data through negligence or malice. Entanglement provides an incentive
for the storage provider to take extra care in protecting average users’ documents by increasing the cost of errors.
We begin in Section 2 by analyzing the intuitive notion of entanglement provided by Dagster and Tangler. We show
that entanglement as provided by Dagster and Tangler is not by itself sufficiently strong to deter a dishonest storage
provider from tampering with data, because not enough documents get deleted on average when destroying a block of
a typical document. This motivates our efforts to obtain a stronger form of an entanglement than the ones provided by
these systems.
In Section 3, we define our general model of entanglement in an untrusted storage system. Our goal here is to
model the entanglement operation itself, and we do not address the question of where in the system entanglement
occurs. However, we do assume that the storage provider does not carry out the entangling operation itself, as giving it
the users’ raw data would allow it to store copies that it could selectively return later, even if the entangled store were
lost or damaged. Instead, some trusted third party is assumed to carry out the entangling operation, and a negligent or
malicious storage provider is modeled separately as a “tamperer” that has access only to the entangled store.
Section 4 contains our definitions of document dependency, where a document cannot be recovered if any
document it depends on is lost, and all-or-nothing integrity, where no document can be recovered if any document
is lost. These definitions allow a system-independent description of the binding between entangled documents. We
then consider how different levels of attacks on the common data store do or do not prevent enforcement of document
dependency or all-or-nothing integrity.
In particular, we show that, if all clients use a standard algorithm to recover their data, then all-or-nothing integrity
requires only the ability to detect tampering using a MAC (Section 5.1); in this model, the standard recovery algorithm
is too polite to return any user’s data if any other user’s data have been lost. Relying on such fastidiousness provides
only a weak guarantee; what we really want is that all data become irretrievable even by non-standard algorithms
if any is lost. We show that this goal is impossible if an adversary is allowed to both tamper with the common
store arbitrarily and provide a replacement recovery algorithm (Section 5.2). Despite such upgrade attacks, it is still
possible to provide a weaker guarantee that we call symmetric recovery, in which each document is equally likely
to be destroyed (Section 5.3). Furthermore, if we restrict the adversary to destructive tampering, which reduces
the amount of information in the common store, all-or-nothing guarantees are possible even with upgrade attacks
(Section 5.4).
These results provide a first step towards understanding document dependency. We discuss the strengths and
limitations of our approach and offer suggestions for future work in Section 6.
1.1. Related work
Entanglement is motivated by the goal of deterring data tampering by untrusted servers, a more general problem that
has been studied extensively. Entanglement has been used specifically in Dagster [20] and Tangler [14], as we describe
in Section 2. Other approaches to preventing or deterring tampering include replication across global networks of
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tamper-resistant servers [1,3,4,8,16,21] or tamper detection [5–7,11–13,19] using digital signatures and Merkle hash
trees [15]. Replication protects against data loss if a small number of servers are compromised; tamper detection
prevents data loss from going unnoticed. Both techniques complement the entanglement approach considered here.
All-or-nothing integrity as defined in the present work is related to the guarantee provided by the all-or-nothing
transform proposed by Rivest [17]. An all-or-nothing transform is an invertible transform that guarantees that no bits
of the preimage can be recovered if ` bits of the image are lost. All-or-nothing transforms are not directly applicable
to our problem, because we consider the more general case in which the image may be corrupted in other ways, such
as by superencryption1 or alteration of part or all of the common store.
2. Dagster and Tangler
In Sections 2.1 and 2.2, we review how Dagster [20] and Tangler [14] work, concentrating on their operations
at a block level. For simplicity, we assume that each user’s document is small enough to fit into a single server
block and need not be split up into pieces. In Section 2.3, we analyze the resulting entangling effects and show their
shortcomings for protecting data from a negligent storage provider. This analysis motivates us to introduce stronger
notions of entanglement in Section 4.
2.1. Dagster
The Dagster storage system may run on a single server or on a P2P overlay network. Each document in Dagster
consists of c + 1 server blocks: c blocks of older documents and one new block, an exclusive-or of previous blocks
with the document. The c + 1 blocks that must be XORed to recover the document are listed in a Dagster Resource
Locator (DRL). The storage protocol proceeds as follows:
Initialization. Upon startup, the server creates approximately 1000 random server blocks. Each user i generates a
private key ki .
Entanglement. To publish document di , user i chooses c random server blocks Ci1 , . . . ,Cic and computes a new
block
Ci = Eki (di )⊕
⊕
j=1...c
Ci j ,
where E is a secure encryption function and ⊕ is bitwise exclusive-or. Hashes of blocks needed to reconstruct di
are recorded in a DRL:(
ki , pi
[
H(Ci ), H(Ci1), H(Ci2), . . . , H(Cic )
])
.
Here H(·) is a cryptographic hash function, and pi is a random permutation.
Recovery. To recover di , the user asks the server for blocks in di ’s DRL. If hashes of the blocks returned by the
server match the ones in the DRL, the user computes:
Dki
(
Ci ⊕
⊕
j=1...c
Ci j
)
,
where D is a decryption function. Otherwise, the user exits.
2.2. Tangler
The Tangler storage system uses (3, 4) Shamir secret sharing [18] to entangle the data. Each document is
represented by four server blocks, any three of which are sufficient to reconstruct the original document. The blocks
1 In a superencryption attack, the adversary encrypts the data store under some key and then blackmails the users into paying him money in
exchange for the key. We discuss different kinds of adversarial attacks in Section 3.2.
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Fig. 1. An entanglement graph is a bipartite graph from the set of documents to the set of server blocks. Edge (d j ,Ck ) is in the graph if server
block Ck can be used to reconstruct document d j .
get replicated across a subset of Tangler servers. Hashes of blocks are recorded in a data structure, similar to a Dagster
Resource Locator, called an inode. Here is the storage protocol:
Initialization. As in Dagster, the server is jump-started with a bunch of random blocks.
Entanglement. Each server block in Tangler is a pair (x, y), where x ∈ GF(216), and y is the value of a polynomial
at x . To publish di , user i downloads two random server blocks, Ci1 and Ci2 , and interpolates them with (0, di ) to
form a quadratic polynomial f (·). He evaluates f (·) at two random (non-zero) integers to get new blocks, C ′i1 and
C ′i2 , uploads the new blocks, and records the hashes of blocks comprising di (viz., Ci1 ,Ci2 ,C
′
i1
,C ′i2 ) in the inode.
Recovery. To recover his document, user i sends a request for blocks in di ’s inode to a subset of Tangler servers.
Upon receiving three of di ’s blocks, the user can reconstruct f (·) and compute di = f (0).
2.3. Analysis of entanglement
At a given point in time, a Dagster or Tangler server contains a set of blocks {C1, . . . ,Cm} comprising documents
{d1, . . . , dn} of a set of users. (Here m, n ∈ N and m ≥ n.) Data are partitioned in a way that each block becomes a
part of several documents. We can draw an entanglement graph (see Fig. 1), which has an edge (d j ,Ck) if block Ck
belongs to document d j . This connection is rather tenuous—even if (d j ,Ck) is in the graph, it may still be possible
to reconstruct d j from blocks excluding Ck . Document nodes in Dagster’s entanglement graph have out-degree c+ 1,
and those in Tangler’s have out-degree 4. Entangled documents share one or more server blocks. In Fig. 1, documents
d1 and dn are entangled because they share server block C1; meanwhile, documents d1 and d2 are not entangled.
This shared-block notion of entanglement has several drawbacks. Even if document d j is entangled with a specific
document, it may still be possible to delete d j from the server without affecting that particular document. For example,
knowing that dn is entangled with d1 (as in Fig. 1) and that d1 is owned by some Very Important Person may give
solace to the owner of dn , who might assume that no adversary would dare incur the wrath of the VIP merely to destroy
dn . But in the situation depicted in the figure, the adversary can still delete server blocks C2 and Cm and corrupt dn
but not d1.
The resulting dependence between documents is thus very weak. We now derive an upper bound on how many
documents get destroyed if we delete a random document from a Dagster or Tangler server. One might expect that
the earlier the document was uploaded to the server, the more documents it will be entangled with and the more other
documents will be destroyed. This turns out to be the case, as we prove for any specific target document in Lemmas 1
and 2.
2.3.1. Deleting a targeted document
We consider a restricted adversary, who randomly chooses several blocks of an arbitrary document (one block in
Dagster; two in Tangler) and overwrites them with zeroes. How many other documents will it destroy?
Without loss of generality, we assume that documents are numbered in the order in which they were uploaded;
namely, for all 1 ≤ j < n, document d j was uploaded to the server before d j+1. Then, we have:
Lemma 1. In a Dagster server with n0 = O(1) initial blocks and n documents, where each document is linked with
c pre-existing blocks, deleting a random block of document d j (1 ≤ j ≤ n) destroys on average
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O
(
c log
(
n
j
))
other documents.
Proof. Altogether, there are n0 + n blocks stored on the server: n0 initial blocks and n data blocks. We label the
data blocks C1, . . . ,Cn . The initial blocks exist on the server before any data blocks have been added. We label them
C−n0+1, . . . ,C0.
Every document d j consists of c pre-existing or “old” blocks2 and a “new” data block C j that is computed during
the entanglement stage. Consider an adversary who destroys a random block Ci of d j . This will destroy d j , but it
will also destroy any documents with outgoing edges to Ci in the entanglement graph. We would like to compute the
number of such documents, Ni .
If Ci is a data block (i.e., i ≥ 1), then
E[Ni ] =
n∑
k=i
Pr[dk has an edge to Ci ]
= 1+
n∑
k=i+1
(
1−
(
k − 2+ n0
c
)/(
k − 1+ n0
c
))
= 1+ c
n+n0−1∑
j=i+n0
1
j
= 1+ c(Hn+n0−1 − Hi+n0−1)
= 1+ O
(
c log
(n
i
))
under the assumption that n0 is a constant.
Meanwhile, if Ci is an initial block (i.e., i < 1), it can be linked by any of the documents:
E[Ni ] =
n∑
k=1
Pr[dk has an edge to Ci ]
= O(c log n).
The number of documents deleted on average when the adversary destroys a random block of d j is
Navg = 1j + n0
(
j∑
i=−n0
E[Ni ]
)
<
1
j
(
O(c log n)+
j∑
i=1
O
(
c log
(n
i
)))
. (1)
We use Stirling’s formula to bound the leading term in (1):
j∑
i=1
O
(
c log
(n
i
))
= O
(
c log
(
j∏
i=1
n
i
))
= O
(
cj log
(
n
j/e
)
− 1
2
c log (2pi j)
)
= O
(
cj log
(
n
j
))
.
The lemma follows. 
We also have:
2 These may be either initial blocks or data blocks of documents added earlier than d j (i.e., dk with k < j).
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Lemma 2. In a Tangler server with n0 = O(1) initial blocks and n documents, deleting two random blocks of
document d j (1 ≤ j ≤ n) destroys on average
O
(
1
j
)
other documents.
Proof. The server contains n0 + 2n blocks: n0 initial blocks and 2n data blocks. We label the blocks as in the proof
of Theorem 3. The initial blocks are C−n0+1, . . . ,C0, and the data blocks are C1,C2, . . . ,C2n−1,C2n .
In Tangler, every document d j consists of two old blocks of pre-existing documents and two new blocks C2 j−1 and
C2 j , computed during the entanglement stage. Suppose an adversary deletes any two out of four blocks comprising d j ;
call these blocks Ci ,Ct . Then any document dk (k 6= j) that contains both Ci and Ct (viz., has edges outgoing to Ci
and Ct in the entanglement graph), will also get destroyed. We would like to compute the number of such documents,
Navg.
In our analysis, we consider whether deleted blocks Ci ,Ct are new or old to d j and dk . We consider five cases:
Case 1: Ci ,Ct are old to both d j and dk . For k < j , block k is lost if j chooses from the 2 j − 2 + n0 old blocks
available precisely the two old blocks of k. For k > j , the same occurs if k chooses precisely the two old blocks of
j . Summing over all k, the expected number of deleted documents is
j−1∑
k=1
1(2 j−2+n0
2
) + n∑
k= j+1
1(2k−2+n0
2
) .
Case 2: Ci ,Ct are old to d j . However, only one of them is old to dk , while the other is new to dk . In this case, we
must have k < j . There are four ways j can choose an old and a new block of k, giving
j−1∑
k=1
4(2 j−2+n0
2
) .
Case 3: Ci ,Ct are old to d j , but new to dk . In this case, we must also have k < j . The expected loss is
j−1∑
k=1
1(2 j−2+n0
2
) .
Case 4: One of Ci ,Ct is old to d j , the other is new to d j . Then both Ci and Ct must be old to dk (because otherwise
we would have k < j , which implies that the block in Ci ,Ct that is new to d j is not linked to dk , which further
implies that dk will not get deleted). As in case 2, there are four ways to choose one old and one new block for j ,
giving
n∑
k= j+1
4(2k−2+n0
2
) .
Case 5: Ci ,Ct are new to d j . In this case, both Ci and Ct must be old to dk (for the same reason as in Case 4). The
contribution of this case is
n∑
k= j+1
1(2k−2+n0
2
) .
Summing up the five cases gives us the total number of documents destroyed:
Navg = 6( j − 1)(2 j−2+n0
2
) + n∑
k= j+1
6(2k−2+n0
2
)
<
6
2 j − 3 +
n∑
k= j+1
3
(k − 32 )2
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<
6
2 j − 3 +
∫ n
j
3
(x − 32 )2
dx
= 12
2 j − 3 −
6
2n − 3
= O
(
1
j
)
for large n. 
2.3.2. Deleting a random document
The effects of deleting a document chosen uniformly at random, stated in Theorems 3 and 4, are computed by
averaging bounds (given in Lemmas 1 and 2) over all documents:
Theorem 3. In a Dagster server with n documents, where each document is linked with c pre-existing blocks, deleting
a block of a random document destroys on average O(c) other documents.
Proof. By Lemma 1, deleting document d j (1 ≤ j ≤ n) affects O (c log(n/j)) other documents. Averaging over all
j , we get:
1
n
n∑
j=1
O
(
c log
(
n
j
))
= O
(
c
n
log
(
n∏
j=1
n
j
))
= O
(
c
n
log
(
nn
(n/e)n
))
= O(c)
as claimed. 
One might expect the theorem to follow immediately from the fact that each document depends on c blocks, which
means (when n is large enough that the number of blocks and documents are proportional) that the average block is
used by Θ(c) documents. While such an argument does tell us what happens if the adversary deletes a block chosen
uniformly at random, choosing a document uniformly at random and then choosing a block from that document biases
the choice of block toward earlier blocks that are used in more documents; nonetheless, Theorem 3 shows that this
bias provides at most a constant increase in the destructive effect.
Meanwhile, Lemma 2 tells us that removing document d j from the Tangler server affects O(1/j) other documents
on average. It is immediate that
Theorem 4. In a Tangler server with n documents, deleting two blocks of a random document destroys on average
O
(
log n
n
)
other documents.
Even a small chance of destroying an important document will deter tampering to some extent, but some tamperers
might be willing to run that risk. Still more troubling is the possibility that the tamperer might first flood the system
with junk documents so that almost all real documents were entangled only with junk. Since our bounds show that
destruction of a typical document will on average affect only a handful of others in Dagster and almost none in Tangler,
we will need stronger entanglement mechanisms if entanglement is to deter tampering by itself.
3. Our model
In Section 3.1, we start by giving a basic framework for systems that entangle data. Specializing the general
framework gives specific system models, differentiated by the choice of recovery algorithms and restrictions placed
on the adversary. We discuss them in Section 3.2.
Our model abstracts away many details of the storage and recovery processes. It concentrates on a single
entanglement operation that takes documents of a finite set of users and intertwines these documents to form a
common store. In practice, the server contents would be computed as an aggregation of common stores from multiple
entanglement operations. We defer analyzing this more complex case to later work; see the discussion of possible
extensions to the model in Section 6.
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Fig. 2. Initialization, entanglement, and tampering stages.
3.1. Basic framework
The model consists of an initialization phase, in which keys are generated and distributed to the various
participants in the system; an entanglement phase, in which the individual users’ data are combined into a common
store; a tampering phase, in which the adversary corrupts the store; and a recovery phase, in which the users attempt
to retrieve their data from the corrupted store using one or more recovery algorithms. For simplicity of notation, we
number the users {1, . . . , n}, where every user i possesses a document di that he wants to publish.
An encoding scheme consists of three probabilistic Turing machines (I, E, R) that run in time polynomial in the
size of their inputs and a security parameter s. The first of these, the initialization algorithm I , hands out the keys
used in the encoding and recovery phases. The second, the encoding algorithm E , combines the users’ data into
a common store using the encoding key. The third, the recovery algorithm R, attempts to recover each user’s data
using the appropriate recovery key. The initialization algorithm takes as input the number of users n and a security
parameter s. We assume that the number of users and the total size of users’ data are polynomial in s.
Acting against the encoding scheme is an adversary ( Iˇ , Tˇ , Rˇ), which also consists of three probabilistic
polynomial-time Turing machines. The first is an adversary-initialization algorithm Iˇ ; like the good initializer
I , the evil Iˇ is responsible for generating keys used by other parts of the adversary during the protocol. The second is
a tampering algorithm Tˇ that modifies the common store. The third is a non-standard recovery algorithm Rˇ that
may be used by some or all of the users to recover their data from the modified store.
We assume that Iˇ , Tˇ and Rˇ are chosen after I , E , and R are known but that a fixed triple ( Iˇ , Tˇ , and Rˇ) is used for
arbitrarily large values of s and n. This is necessary for polynomial-time bounds on Tˇ and Rˇ to have any effect.
Given an encoding scheme (I, E, R) and an adversary ( Iˇ , Tˇ , Rˇ), the storage protocol proceeds as follows (see
also Fig. 2):
(1) Initialization. The initializer I generates a combining key kE used by the encoding algorithm and recovery keys
k1, k2, . . . kn , where each key ki is used by the recovery algorithm to recover the data for user i . At the same time,
the adversary initializer Iˇ generates the shared key kˇ for Tˇ and Rˇ.
kE , k1, k2, . . . kn ← I (1s, n),
kˇ ← Iˇ (1s, n).
(2) Entanglement. The encoding algorithm E computes the combined store C from the combining key kE and the
data di :
C ← E(kE , d1, d2, . . . dn).
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(3) Tampering. The tamperer Tˇ transforms the combined store C into Cˇ :
Cˇ ← Tˇ (kˇ,C).
(4) Recovery. The users attempt to recover their data. User i applies his recovery algorithm Ri to ki and the changed
store Cˇ . Each Ri could be either the standard recovery algorithm R, supplied with the encoding scheme, or the
non-standard algorithm Rˇ, supplied by the adversary, depending on the choice of the model.
d ′i ← Ri (ki , Cˇ).
We say that user i recovers his data if the output of Ri equals di .
3.2. Adversary classes
In our model, the adversary corrupts the data store and distributes a new recovery algorithm, which users may or
may not use. It cannot otherwise affect the operation of the storage server. The model is thus divided on two axes, one
bounding the users’ choices of reconstruction algorithms and the other bounding the adversary’s power to modify the
data store. With respect to recovery algorithms, we consider three variants on the basic framework (listed in order of
increasing power given to the adversary):
• In the standard-recovery-algorithm model, the users are restricted to a single standard recovery algorithm R,
supplied by the system designer. Formally, this means Ri = R for all users i ; the adversary’s recovery algorithm
Rˇ is not used. This is the model used to analyze Dagster and Tangler.
• In the public-recovery-algorithm model, the adversary not only modifies the combined store, but also supplies a
single non-standard recovery algorithm Rˇ to all of the users. Formally, we have Ri = Rˇ for each i . The original
recovery algorithm R is not used.3
We call this an upgrade attack by analogy to the real-life situation of a company changing the data format
of documents processed by its software and distributing a new version of the software to read them. We believe
such an attack is a realistic possibility, because most self-interested users will be happy to adopt a new recovery
algorithm if it offers new features or performance or if the alternative is losing their data.
• In the private-recovery-algorithm model, the adversary may choose to supply the non-standard recovery
algorithm Rˇ to only a subset of the users. The rest continue to use the standard algorithm R. Formally, this model
is a mix of the previous two models: Ri = R for some i and Ri = Rˇ for others.
We also differentiate between two types of tamperers:
• An arbitrary tamperer can freely corrupt the data store and is not restricted in any way. Most real-life systems fit
into this category, because they place no restrictions on the tamperer.
• A destructive tamperer can only apply to the store a transformation whose range of possible outputs is
substantially smaller than the set of inputs. The destructive tamperer can superimpose its own encryption on the
common store, transform the store in arbitrary ways, and even add additional data, provided that the cumulative
effect of all these operations is to decrease the entropy of the data store. Though a destructive tampering assumption
may look like an artificial restriction, it subsumes natural models of block deletion or corruption, and either it or
some similar assumption is needed to achieve all-or-nothing integrity in the private-recovery-algorithm model.
An adversary class specifies what kind of tamperer Tˇ is and which users, if any, receive Rˇ as their recovery
algorithm. Altogether, we consider six adversary classes, each corresponding to a combination of constraints on the
tamperer and the recovery algorithms.
4. Dependency and all-or-nothing integrity
We now give our definition of document dependency for a particular encoding scheme and adversary class. We first
discuss some basic definitions and assumptions in Section 4.1. Our strong notions of entanglement, called dependency
and all-or-nothing integrity, are defined formally in Section 4.2.
3 Though it may seem unreasonable to prevent users from choosing the original recovery algorithm R, any R can be rendered useless in practice
by superencrypting the data store and distributing the decryption key only with the adversary’s Rˇ. We discuss this issue further in Section 5.2.
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4.1. Preliminaries
Because we consider protocols involving probabilistic Turing machines, we must be careful in talking about
probabilities. Fix an encoding (I, E, R), an adversary A = ( Iˇ , Tˇ , Rˇ), and the recovery algorithm Ri for each user i .
An execution of the resulting system specifies the inputs ki and di to E , the output of E , the tamperer’s input kˇ and
output Cˇ , and the output of the recovery algorithm Ri (R(ki , Cˇ) or Rˇ(kˇ, ki , Cˇ) as appropriate) for each user. The set of
possible executions of the storage system is assigned probabilities in the obvious way: the probability of an execution
is taken over the inputs to the storage system and the coin tosses of the encoding scheme and the adversary. It will be
convenient to consider multiple adversaries with a fixed encoding scheme. In this case, we use PrA(Q) to denote the
probability that an event Q occurs when A is the adversary.
During an execution of the storage system, the tamperer alters the combined store from C into Cˇ . As a result, some
users end up recovering their documents while others do not. We summarize which users recover their documents in a
recovery vector, which is a vector-valued random variable Er in which ri = 1 if Ri (ki , Cˇ) = di (i.e., if user i recovers
his document) and 0 otherwise. For example, if the server contains documents d1, d2, and d3 and in an execution we
recover only d1 and d2, then Er = 110.
4.2. Our notions of entanglement
In Section 2, we observed that the block-sharing notion of entanglement provided by Dagster and Tangler is not
adequate for our purposes. This motivates us to propose the notion of document dependency, which formalizes the
idea that “if my data depends on yours, I can’t get my data back if you can’t”. In this way, the fates of specific
documents become linked together: specifically, if document di depends on document d j , then whenever d j cannot
be recovered neither can di .
Given just one execution, either users i and j each get their data back or they don’t. So how can we say that the
particular outcome for i depends on the outcome for j? Essentially, we are saying that we are happy with executions
in which either j recovers its data (whether or not i does) or in which j does not recover its data and i does not either.
Executions in which j does not recover its data but i does are bad executions in this sense. We will try to exclude
these bad executions by saying that they either never occur or occur only with very low probability. Formally:
Definition 5. A document di depends on a document d j with respect to a class of adversaries A, denoted di A↪→ d j ,
if, for all adversaries A ∈ A,
Pr
A
[
(ri = 1)⇒ (r j = 1)
] ≥ 1− .
Here and after,  refers to a negligible function of the security parameter s.4
The ultimate form of dependency is all-or-nothing integrity. Intuitively, a storage system is all-or-nothing if either
every user i recovers his data or no user does:
Definition 6. A storage system is all-or-nothing with respect to a class of adversaries A if, for all A ∈ A,
Pr
A
[Er = 0n ∨ Er = 1n] ≥ 1− .
It is easy to show that
Theorem 7. A storage system is all-or-nothing with respect to a class of adversaries A if and only if, for all users
i, j , di
A
↪→ d j .
Proof. Fix an adversary in A. Let E be the event that an execution of the storage system is not all-or-nothing, and
Fi j the event that document di was recovered in an execution and d j was not. Then E = {Er 6= 0n ∧ Er 6= 1n} and
Fi j = {ri = 1 ∧ r j = 0}.
(⇒): If the system is all-or-nothing, then Pr[E] < . Clearly, for all i, j , we have Fi j ⊆ E , which means
Pr[Fi j ] ≤ Pr[E] < . This in turn implies di A↪→ d j .
4 A function  : N 7→ (0, 1) is negligible if for every c > 0, for all sufficiently large s, (s) < 1/sc . See any standard reference, such as [9], for
details.
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(⇐): If for all i, j , di A↪→ d j , then Pr[Fi j ] < . We can choose  < ′/n2 for a negligible ′. Notice that
E ⊆ ⋃i, j Fi j . Therefore, Pr[E] ≤∑i, j Pr[Fi j ] < n2 < ′. Hence, Pr[Ec] ≥ 1− ′ and so the storage system is
all-or-nothing. 
All-or-nothing integrity is a very strong property. In some models, we may not be able to achieve it, and we
will accept a weaker property called symmetric recovery. Symmetric recovery requires that all users recover their
documents with equal probability:
Definition 8. A storage system has symmetric recovery with respect to a class of adversariesA if, for all A ∈ A and
all users i and j ,
Pr
A
[ri = 1] = Pr
A
[r j = 1].
Symmetric recovery says nothing about what happens in particular executions. For example, it is consistent with
the definition for exactly one of the data items to be recovered in every execution, as long as the adversary cannot
affect which data item is recovered. This is not as strong a property as all-or-nothing integrity, but it is the best that
can be done in some cases.
5. Possibility and impossibility results
The possibility of achieving all-or-nothing integrity (abbreviated AONI) depends on the class of adversaries we
consider. In Section 5.1 through 5.3, we consider adversaries with an arbitrary tamperer. We show that AONI cannot
always be achieved in this case. Then in Section 5.4, we look at adversaries with a destructive tamperer. We give
a simple interpolation scheme that achieves all-or-nothing integrity for a destructive tamperer in all three recovery
models.
5.1. Possibility of AONI for standard-recovery-algorithm model
In the standard-recovery-algorithm model, all users use the standard recovery algorithm R; that is Ri = R for all
users i .
This model allows a very simple mechanism for all-or-nothing integrity based on Message Authentication Codes
(MACs). The intuition behind this mechanism is that the encoding algorithm E simply tags the data store with a MAC
using a key known to all the users, and the recovery algorithm R returns an individual user’s data only if the MAC on
the entire database is valid.
We begin by recalling some standard definitions (see [10]). A MAC consists of three algorithms
(GEN,TAG,VER):
(1) A key generator GEN on input 1s outputs an s-bit key kMAC.
(2) A tagging algorithm TAG on input kMAC and message m (|m| ≤ sc) computes a signature σ .
(3) A verification algorithm VER can be used to check if σ is a valid signature on m. It has the property that
V ER(kMAC,m, T AG(kMAC,m)) = accept for all m.
We require a MAC to be existentially unforgeable under chosen message attacks. This means there is no polynomial
time forger F that generates a new message-signature pair (m′, σ ′) that is accepted by V ER with probability
exceeding O(s−c) for any c > 0, even if F is given a sample of valid message-signature pairs (mi , σi ), where
mi is chosen by the adversary.
Our encoding scheme (I, E, R) is based on a MAC scheme (GEN , T AG, V ER) as follows:
Initialization. The initialization algorithm I computes kMAC = GEN (1s). It then returns an encoding key kE =
kMAC and recovery keys ki = (i, kMAC).
Entanglement. The encoding algorithm E generates an n-tuple
m = (d1, d2, . . . , dn) and returns C = (m, σ ) where σ = T AG(kMAC,m).
Recovery. The standard recovery algorithm R takes as input a key ki = (i, kMAC) and the (possibly modified) store
Cˇ = (mˇ, σˇ ). It returns mˇi if V ER(kMAC, mˇ, σˇ ) = accept and returns a default value ⊥ otherwise.
The following theorem states that this encoding scheme achieves all-or-nothing integrity with standard recovery
algorithms:
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Theorem 9. Let (GEN , T AG, V ER) be a MAC scheme that is existentially unforgeable against chosen message
attacks, and let (I, E, R) be an encoding scheme based on this MAC scheme as above. LetA be the class of adversaries
that does not provide non-standard recovery algorithms Rˇ. Then there exists some minimum s0 such that for any
security parameter s ≥ s0 and any inputs d1, . . . , dn with∑ |di | ≤ s, (I, E, R) is all-or-nothing with respect to A.
Proof. Fix some c > 0. Recall that the adversary changes the combined store from C = (m, σ ) to Cˇ = (mˇ, σˇ ). We
consider two cases, depending on whether or not mˇ = m.
In the first case, mˇ = m. Suppose R(ki , Cˇ) = di but R(k j , Cˇ) 6= d j . Then R(k j , Cˇ) = ⊥, which implies
that V (kMAC,m, σˇ ) 6= accept when computed by R(k j , Cˇ) and thus that σˇ 6= σ . But R(ki , Cˇ) = di only if
V (kMAC,m, σˇ ) = accept when computed by R(ki , Cˇ). It follows that (m, σˇ ) is a message-MAC pair not equal to
(m, σ ) that V accepts in the execution of R(ki , Cˇ); by the security assumption this occurs for a particular execution
of V only with probability O(s−c′) for any fixed c′. If we choose c′ and s0 so that the O(s−c
′
) term is smaller than
1
2n s
−c for s ≥ s0, then the probability that any of the n executions of V in the recovery stage accepts (m, σˇ ) in some
case where m = mˇ, is bounded by 12 s−c.
In the second case,m 6= mˇ. Now (mˇ, σˇ ) is a message-MAC pair not equal to (m, σ ). If every execution of V rejects
(mˇ, σˇ ), then all R(di , Cˇ) return ⊥ and the execution has a recovery vector 0n . The only bad case is when at least one
execution of V erroneously accepts (mˇ, σˇ ). But using the security assumption and choosing c′, s0 as in the previous
case, we again have that the probability that V accepts (mˇ, σˇ ) in any of the n executions of R is at most 12 s
−c.
Summing the probabilities of the two bad cases gives us the desired bound: PrA[Er = 0n ∨ Er = 1n] > 1− s−c. 
5.2. Impossibility of AONI for public and private-recovery-algorithm models
In both these models, the adversary modifies the common store and distributes a non-standard recovery algorithm
Rˇ to the users (either to all users or only to a few select accomplices). Let us begin by showing that all-or-nothing
integrity cannot be achieved consistently in either case:
Theorem 10. For any encoding scheme (I, E, R), if A is the class of adversaries providing non-standard recovery
algorithms Rˇ, then (I, E, R) is not all-or-nothing with respect to A.
Proof. Let the adversary initializer Iˇ be a no-op and let the tamperer Tˇ be the identity transformation. We will rely
entirely on the non-standard recovery algorithm to destroy all-or-nothing integrity.
Let Rˇ flip a biased coin that comes up tails with probability 1/n, and return the result of running R on its input if
the coin comes up heads and ⊥ if the coin comes up tails. Then exactly one document is not returned with probability
n · (1/n) · (1− 1/n)n−1, which converges to 1/e in the limit. The outcome is all-or-nothing only if all instances of Rˇ
flip the same way, which occurs with probability PrA[Er = 0n ∨ Er = 1n] < 1− 1/e. 
This proof is rather trivial, which suggests that letting the adversary substitute an error-prone recovery algorithm in
place of the standard one gives the adversary far too much power. But it is not at all clear how to restrict the model to
allow the adversary to provide an improved recovery algorithm without allowing for this particular attack. Allowing
users to apply the original recovery algorithm R can be defeated by superencrypting the data store and burying the
decryption key in the error-prone Rˇ; defeating this attack would require analyzing Rˇ to undo the superencryption and
remove the errors, a task that is likely to be difficult in practice.5
On the other hand, we do not know of any general mechanism to ensure that no useful information can be gleaned
from Rˇ, and it is not out of the question that there is an encoding so transparent that no superencryption can disguise
it for sufficiently large inputs, given that both Rˇ and the adversary’s key kˇ are public.
5.3. Possibility of symmetric recovery for public-recovery-algorithm model
As we have seen, if we place no restrictions on the tamperer, it becomes impossible to achieve all-or-nothing
integrity in the public-recovery-algorithm model. We now show that we can still achieve symmetric recovery.
5 Whether it is difficult from a theoretical perspective depends on how well Rˇ can be obfuscated. Though obfuscation is impossible in general [2],
recovering useful information from Rˇ is likely to be difficult in practice, especially if the random choice to decrypt incorrectly is not a single if-then
test but is the result of accumulating error distributed throughout its computation.
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Because we cannot prevent mass destruction of data, we will settle for preventing targeted destruction. The basic
intuition is that if the encoding process is symmetric with respect to permutations of the data, then neither the
adversary nor its partner, the non-standard recovery algorithm, can distinguish between different inputs. Symmetry in
the encoding algorithm is not difficult to achieve and basically requires not including any positional information in the
keys or the representation of data in the common store. One example of a symmetric encoding is a trivial mechanism
that tags each input di with a random ki and then stores a sequence of (di , ki ) pairs in random order.
Symmetry in the data is a stronger requirement. We assume that users’ documents di are independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables. If documents are not i.i.d (in particular, if they are fixed), we can
use a simple trick to make them appear i.i.d.: Each user i picks a small number ri independently and uniformly at
random, remembers the number, and computes d ′i = di ⊕ G(ri ), where G is a pseudorandom generator. The new d ′i
are also uniform and independent (and thus computationally indistinguishable from i.i.d.). The users can then store
documents d ′i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) instead of the original documents di . To recover di , user i would retrieve d ′i from the server
and compute di = d ′i ⊕ G(ri ).
We shall need a formal definition of symmetric encodings:
Definition 11. An encoding scheme (I, E, R) is symmetric if, for any s and n, any inputs d1, d2, . . . dn , and any
permutation pi of the indices 1 through n, the joint distribution of k1, k2, . . . , kn and C in executions with user inputs
d1, d2, . . . dn is computationally indistinguishable from the joint distribution of kpi1 , kpi2 , . . . , kpin and C in executions
with user inputs dpi1 , dpi2 , . . . dpin .
Using this definition, we can show that any symmetric encoding gives symmetric recovery:
Theorem 12. Let (I, E, R) be a symmetric encoding scheme. Let A be a class of adversaries as in Theorem 10. Fix
s and n, and let d1, . . . , dn be random variables that are independent and identically distributed. Then (I, E, R) has
symmetric recovery with respect to A.
Proof. Fix i and j . From Definition 11 we have that the joint distribution of the ki and C is symmetric with respect
to permutation of the user indices; in particular, for any fixed d, S and x ,
Pr[C = S, ki = x | di = d] = Pr[C = S, k j = x | d j = d]. (2)
We also have, from the assumption that the di are i.i.d.,
Pr[di = d] = Pr[d j = d]. (3)
Using (2) and (3), we get
Pr[Rˇ(kˇ, ki , Tˇ (C)) = di ] =
∑
x,S,d
Pr[Rˇ(kˇ, x, Tˇ (S)) = d]Pr[C = S, ki = x, di = d]
=
∑
x,S,d
Pr[Rˇ(kˇ, x, Tˇ (S)) = d]Pr[C = S, ki = x | di = d]Pr[di = d]
=
∑
x,S,d
Pr[Rˇ(kˇ, x, Tˇ (S)) = d]Pr[C = S, k j = x | d j = d]Pr[d j = d]
= Pr[Rˇ(kˇ, k j , Cˇ) = d j ].
This is simply another way of writing PrA[ri = 1] = PrA[r j = 1]. 
5.4. Possibility of AONI for destructive adversaries
Given the results of the previous sections, to achieve all-or-nothing integrity we need to place some additional
restrictions on the adversary.
A tampering algorithm Tˇ is destructive if the range of Tˇ when applied to an input domain of m distinct possible
data stores has size less than m. The amount of destructiveness is measured in bits: if the range of Tˇ when applied to
a domain of size m has size r , then Tˇ destroys lgm − lg r bits of entropy. Note that it is not necessarily the case that
the outputs of Tˇ are smaller than its inputs; it is enough that there be fewer of them.
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Below, we describe a particular encoding, based on polynomial interpolation, with the property that after a
sufficiently destructive tampering, the probability that any recovery algorithm can reconstruct a particular di is small.
While this is trivially true for an unrestrained tamperer that destroys all lgm bits of the common store, our scheme
requires only that with n documents the tamperer destroy slightly more than n lg(n/) bits before the probability that
any of the data can be recovered drops below  (a formal statement of this result is found in Corollary 14). Since n
counts only the number of users and not the size of the data, for a fixed population of users the number of bits that
can be destroyed before all users lose their data is effectively a constant independent of the size of the store being
tampered with.
The encoding scheme is as follows. It assumes that each data item can be encoded as an element of Zp, where p is
a prime of roughly s bits.
Initialization. The initialization algorithm I chooses k1, k2, . . . kn independently and uniformly at random without
replacement from Zp. It sets kE = (k1, k2, . . . , kn) and then returns kE , k1, . . . , kn .
Entanglement. The encoding algorithm E computes, using Lagrange interpolation, the coefficients cn−1, cn−2,
. . . , c0 of the unique (n−1)-degree polynomial f over Zp with the property that f (ki ) = di for each i = 1, . . . , n.
It returns C = (cn−1, cn−2, . . . , c0).
Recovery. The standard recovery algorithm R returns f (ki ), where f is the polynomial whose coefficients are given
by C .
Intuitively, the reason the tamperer cannot remove too much entropy without destroying all data is that it cannot
identify which points d = f (k) correspond to actual user keys. When it maps two polynomials f1 and f2 to the same
corrupted store Cˇ , the best that the non-standard recovery algorithm can do is return one of f1(ki ) or f2(ki ) given a
particular key ki . But if too many polynomials are mapped to the same Cˇ , the odds that Rˇ returns the value of the
correct polynomial will be small.
A complication is that a particularly clever adversary could look for polynomials whose values overlap; if
f1(k) = f2(k), it doesn’t matter which f the recovery algorithm picks. But here we can use that fact that two
degree (n − 1) polynomials cannot overlap in more than (n − 1) places without being equal. This limits how much
packing the adversary can do.
As in Theorem 12, we assume that the user inputs d1, . . . , dn are chosen independently and have identical
distributions. We make a further assumption that each di is chosen uniformly from Zp. This is necessary to ensure
that the resulting polynomials span the full pn possibilities.6
Under these conditions, sufficiently destructive tampering prevents recovery of any information with high
probability. We will show an accurate but inconvenient bound on this probability in Theorem 13 and give a cruder but
more useful statement of the bound in Corollary 14.
Theorem 13. Let (I, E, R) be defined as above. Let A = ( Iˇ , Tˇ , Rˇ) be an adversary where Tˇ is destructive: for a
fixed input size and security parameter, there is a constant M such that for each key kˇ,
|{Tˇ (kˇ, f )}| ≤ M,
where f ranges over the possible store values, i.e. over all degree-(n − 1) polynomials over Zp. If the di are drawn
independently and uniformly from Zp, then the probability that at least one user i recovers di using Rˇ is
Pr
A
[Er 6= 0n] < n
2 + nM1/n
p
, (4)
even if all users use Rˇ as their recovery algorithm.
Proof. Condition on kˇ and the outcome of all coin-flips used by Tˇ and Rˇ. Then, there are exactly pn
(p
n
)
possible
executions, each of equal probability, determined by the pn choices for the di and the
(p
n
)
choices for the ki . For each
i , we will show that the number of these executions in which Rˇ(kˇ, ki , Cˇ) = di is small.
6 The assumption that the documents are i.i.d. does not constrain the applicability of our results much, because the technique to get rid of it
described in Section 5.2 can also be used here.
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For each degree-(n − 1) polynomial f , define f ∗ to be the function mapping each k in Zp to Rˇ(kˇ, k, Tˇ (kˇ, f )).
Note that f ∗ is deterministic given that we are conditioning on kˇ and all coin-flips in Tˇ and Rˇ. Define C f , the correct
inputs for f , to be the set of keys k for which f (k) = f ∗(k).
The adversary produces a correct output only if at least one of the n user keys appears in C f . For a given f , the
probability that none of the keys appear in C f is(p−|C f |
n
)(p
n
) > (p − |C f | − n)n
pn
=
(
1− |C f | + n
p
)n
> 1− n(|C f | + n)
p
,
and so the probability that at least one key appears in C f is at most np |C f | + n
2
p . Averaging over all f then gives
Pr
[
f ∗(ki ) = di for at least one i
]
<
n2
p
+ n
pn+1
∑
f
|C f |. (5)
We will now use the bound on the number of distinct f ∗ to show that
∑
f |C f | is small.
Consider the set of all polynomials f1, f2, . . . fm that map to a single function f ∗, and their corresponding sets
of correct keys C f1 ,C f2 , . . .C fm . Because any two degree (n − 1) polynomials are equal if they are equal on any n
elements of Zp, each n-element subset of Zp can be contained in at most one of the C fi . On the other hand, each C fi
contains exactly
(|C fi |
n
)
subsets of size n. Since there are only
(p
n
)
subsets of size n to partition between the C fi , we
have ∑
i
(|C fi |
n
)
≤
(
p
n
)
,
and summing over all M choices of f ∗ then gives∑
f
(|C f |
n
)
≤ M
(
p
n
)
.
We now wish to bound the maximum possible value of
∑
f |C f | given this constraint.
Observe that
(|C f |
n
)
>
(|C f |−n)n
n! when |C f | ≥ n, from which it follows that∑
f :|C f |≥n
(|C f | − n)n < n!
∑
f
(|C f |
n
)
< n!M
(
p
n
)
. (6)
Now, (|C f | − n)n is a convex function of |C f |, so the left-hand side is minimized for fixed∑ f |C f | by setting all|C f | equal. It follows that∑ f |C f | is maximized for fixed∑ f :|C f |≥n(|C f | − n)n when all |C f | are equal.
Setting each |C f | = c and summing over all pn values of f , we get
pn(c − n)n < n!M
(
p
n
)
from which it follows that
c <
1
p
(
n!M
(
p
n
))1/n
+ n,
and thus that∑
f
|C f | ≤ pnc < pn−1
(
n!M
(
p
n
))1/n
+ npn .
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Plugging this bound back into (5) then gives
Pr
A
[Er 6= 0n] = Pr [ f ∗(ki ) = di for at least one i]
<
n2
p
+ n
p2
(
n!M
(
p
n
))1/n
<
n2
p
+ n
p2
(
Mpn
)1/n
= n
2 + nM1/n
p
. 
We can use Theorem 13 to compute the limit on how much information the tamperer can remove before recovering
any of the data becomes impossible:
Corollary 14. Let (I, E, R) and ( Iˇ , Tˇ , Rˇ) be as in Theorem 13. Let  > 0 and let p > 2n3/. If for any fixed kˇ,
tamperer Tˇ destroys at least n lg(n/)+ 1 bits of entropy, then
Pr
A
[Er = 0n] ≥ 1− .
Proof. Let ′ = /
(
1
2n + 2−1/n
)
. If Tˇ destroys at least n lg(n/′)+ 1 bits of entropy, then we have
M ≤ pn · 2−(n lg(n/′)+1)
= 1
2
pn(n/′)−n
= 1
2
(
p′/n
)n
.
Plugging this into (4) gives:
Pr[some di is recovered] ≤ n
2 + nM1/n
p
≤
n2 + n
(
1
2 (p
′/n)n
)1/n
p
= n
2
p
+ 2−1/n′
<
n2
2n3/′
+ 2−1/n′
= ′
(
1
2n
+ 2−1/n
)
= .
We thus have:
Pr
A
[Er = 0n] = 1− Pr[some di is recovered] ≥ 1− . 
According to the corollary, all users will lose their data if the adversary’s tampering destroys even a small amount
of information. Consequently, the interpolation scheme we have described must be all-or-nothing.
6. Conclusion and future work
Our results are summarized below:
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Destructive tamperer Arbitrary tamperer
Standard recovery All-or-nothing All-or-nothing
Public recovery All-or-nothing Symmetric recovery
Private recovery All-or-nothing No guarantees possible
They show that it is possible in principle to achieve all-or-nothing integrity with only mild restrictions on the
adversary. Whether it is possible in practice is a different question. Our model abstracts away most of the details of
the storage and recovery processes, which hides undesirable features of our algorithms such as the need to process
all data being stored simultaneously and the need to read every bit of the data store to recover any data item. Some
of these undesirable features could be removed with a more sophisticated model, such as a round-based model that
treated data as arriving over time, allowing combining algorithms that would touch less of the data store for each
storage or retrieval operation at the cost of making fewer documents depend on each other. The resulting system
might look like a variant of Dagster or Tangler with stronger mechanisms for entanglement. But such a model might
permit more dangerous attacks if the adversary is allowed to tamper with data during storage, and finding the right
balance between providing useful guarantees and modeling realistic attacks will be necessary. We have made a first
step towards this goal in the present work, but much still remains to be done.
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